Posted: December 2nd, 2010
Filed Under: Back Issues , BLOG , January 2011 , ONLINE EXCLUSIVES
Following the headline-making attack on Yeonpyeong island last week, top Korea expert David Kang—director of the Korean Studies Institute at USC, where he also teaches international relations and business—took your questions about the incident, its ramifications and the larger picture of North-South relations. Following are his answers. Thank you to everyone who posted questions and special thanks to David Kang.
Questions after the jump!
Reuters
Q. South Korea has many modern defensive weapons, but failed to use them in a timely manner during the [Yeonpyeong] shelling. Why weren’t these mobilized on or around the islands after the Cheonan sinking or during the shelling? Why did President Lee/military say they would retaliate after the fact?
—Daewooparts, via iamkoream.com
A. To explain the military planning first requires a bit of background about the situation on the west coast: There have been recurring clashes off the west coast of Korea since the Korean War. The latest incident is, unfortunately, only the latest of those skirmishes between the two sides along the Northern Limit Line. Earlier this year, in March, a North Korean torpedo sank South Korean naval vessel Cheonan in the area, and in November 2009 South Korean ships had fired upon a North Korean vessel that was in the disputed waters, damaging it badly. In the summer of 1999 there were two major firefights near Yeonpyeong island, resulting in the deaths of at least six South Korean sailors, 30 North Korean sailors, and the sinking or damaging of three North Korean vessels.
Yeonpyeong is one of a string of small islands just off the west coast of Korea, within viewing distance of the North Korean mainland. At the close of the Korean War in 1953, the UN forces unilaterally declared a maritime division (known as the “Northern Limit Line”) between North and South Korea that essentially encircled the North Korean coast. The North has never recognized the NLL, arguing that the maritime boundary should be perpendicular from the coast, or what the North calls the Military Demarcation Line.
Most of the fighting has been naval skirmishes in this disputed maritime area, and artillery shelling has been rare. Thus, the military forces on the small, South Korea-controlled islands that lie just off the coast of North Korea have traditionally planned to defend at most against infiltration by North Korean commandos, and did not consider that direct artillery fire was a major possibility. In the wake of last week’s artillery attacks,
South Korea’s defense minister, Kim Tae-young, resigned to accept responsibility for inadequately preparing the military to deal with this type of provocation. The South Korean military is also changing its rules of engagement and the types of military deployments it has on the island in order to be better prepared if there is another North Korean artillery attack.
That being said, last week the South Korean military did return artillery fire on North Korea, and at least one report indicates that there could be “considerable North Korean casualties” from the exchange.
Getty Images
Q. What could South Korean President Lee Myung-bak do to North Korea to “pay back” for the recent attack on Yeonpyeong island?
—Julie Kim Kwon, via Facebook
A. In the wake of the attacks on Yeonpyeong island, South Korean President Lee vowed “enormous retaliation,” saying that the South would punish North Korea “through action,” not just words. The U.S. quickly joined in, with President Obama “strongly condemning” the attack and calling the US-ROK alliance a “cornerstone” of U.S. security policy in the Pacific. However, the most likely responses are rhetorical and symbolic, and will involve muscle-flexing and name-calling. In fact, much of the rhetoric from South Korea is aimed at domestic audiences in the South. The open secret is that nobody thinks actually starting a war is worth the risk because the chances for escalation are very real. Thus, options for punishing North Korea are limited to applying some more economic sanctions and rhetorical or symbolic actions, such as the dispatch of a U.S. aircraft carrier to participate in military exercises with the South Korean navy.
Major military action is unlikely because deterrence on the peninsula is quite solid. The South Korean and U.S. militaries are clearly superior to the North Korean military, and would eventually prevail in any conflict. But Seoul—with its population of almost 20 million—lies within range of conventional North Korean artillery batteries, and is essentially a hostage, vulnerable to North Korean attacks. Thus any South Korean president has to weigh the benefit of a strike on North Korea against the risk that the North begins shelling Seoul. In the absence of an imminent threat to South Korea’s actual survival, most leaders would not take that risk. Indeed, a U.S. military assessment of the costs of a full-scale war on the peninsula is one million and one trillion: North Korea would lose the war and cease to exist, but there would be one million casualties and $1 trillion in industrial damage. For that reason, both sides are very careful about escalating military actions against each other.
Q. B.R. Myers wrote an editorial in the New York Times (Nov. 24), somewhat fatalistically stating that North Korea’s aggression is “ideologically built in” and thus, North Korea is “inevitably predestined to push Seoul and Washington too far.” In other words, North Korea will “never play nice” due to the very nature of its military-first regime, which would lose all reason for its existence if it ever negotiated in good faith. Do you agree?
—C.Y., via iamkoream.com
A. There is no doubt that the ideological and cultural makeup of the North Korean leadership is directly at odds with that of South Korea and the U.S., and there is much that is reprehensible about the regime’s policies, from the almost complete lack of basic human rights to its political repression and closed economic policies. But whether the type of regime is the cause of conflict is more questionable. Much of the conflict between the two sides can be explained from the division of the peninsula in 1945 into two competing halves. Since that time, there have been two governments that claim to be the legitimate one for the entire peninsula. These two governments have heavily armed militaries sitting nose to nose with each other. In that situation, mistrust, demonization, and occasional skirmishes are bound to happen, regardless of the ideological makeup of the regimes. For example, it’s pretty clear that conducting live fire military exercises within viewing distance of a national border in a disputed territory is a provocative act. This does not excuse the North Korean response, nor does is it to justify the repression of the North Korean regime. But it does highlight the fundamental problem of two hostile governments intensely competing with each other.
So, although there is inevitably an underlying North Korean threat, we actually have lived with a relatively stable status quo on the peninsula for close to 60 years. The sad fact is that this can go on another 60 years or even longer, unless something unexpected happens.
Q. In a war situation, who is backing North Korea, if anyone?
—Charlie Jun, via Facebook
A. It probably depends on how a war actually starts. If it is an unprovoked North Korean invasion, then the North probably goes it alone. Even China is unlikely to support such a war. Although the Chinese are supportive of North Korea, they are clearly not in favor of starting a war on the peninsula that would have enormous negative consequences for every country in the region. So it is unlikely that China would encourage the North in any type of adventurism.
Q. Is China planning to take over North Korea in the event of instability and a power vacuum, installing Kim Jong-nam (Kim Jong-il’s first son) as the ruler, in order to retain the buffer zone between the Chinese border and South Korean/U.S. forces?
—Fred Lee, via Facebook
A. I would be very surprised if China actually extended political control or even installed a puppet regime in North Korea. North Korea is not a prize for anyone—it’s an economic drain and political nightmare. Not only would it be difficult for China to extend control over North Korea, if China made such an attempt, it also would be harmful to its relations with all the other countries on its 22,000-kilometer borders, each of which would immediately become suspicious of China’s motives. China wants to retain influence over North Korea, but that is different from actual control.
As to Kim Jong-nam, few people think he’s a viable alternative. Jong-nam himself is widely considered a somewhat flaky playboy; for example, in 2001 he was caught trying to sneak into Tokyo Disneyland on a forged Dominican Republic passport. In recent years he has lived in Macao, and now reportedly lives in China and perhaps another country, as well. Given his colorful past, I doubt anyone would view him as a likely political leader!
Q. If the two Koreas were to ever become reunified, what will ultimately happen to those pro-Juche believers in the North? Also, what are some of the immediate negative repercussions of reunification?
—James, via iamkoream.com
A. Here at the USC Korean Studies Institute, along with the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies and my friendly rival Victor Cha, we have begun a long-term research project to study the consequences of unification or collapse of the North Korean regime.
Most governments do not plan for the long term because they have to deal with the daily push and pull of foreign policy. We are only in the beginning stages of such a project, but some interesting findings have already emerged. With Korean unification, there will be a plethora of immediate needs in health, environment, energy and education. Planners will have to balance addressing these immediate needs with investment in longer-term restructuring, which is beneficial to all of Korea (not just the North).
Without preparations now, the costs and problems associated with collapse in North Korea may be so high that the South Korean people could grow resentful towards their Northern neighbors; for example, will there be an influx of North Korean migrants to the South? How will we deal with the demands for “justice”—which could include righting past wrongs (such as those pro-Juche believers in the North), searching for perpetrators of “crimes against humanity” and numerous legal claims in a dubious judicial environment? How do we provide immediate health care, food, and social services to the North Korean people, while still maintaining adequate police forces? We have all seen what happened in Iraq, and so the best hope is to begin to plan now so that the immediate negative repercussions are mitigated. This will be difficult, however: South Korean president Lee’s proposal for a “unification tax” that would put aside money for the eventual costs of unification is highly unpopular in South Korea.
Q. I hear many experts giving logical reasons as to why events conspiring in Korea won’t erupt in to full-out war, but a couple of things worry me: 1) the angry emotional response from the general population and pressures from certain groups demanding full retaliation against North Korea 2) I am reminded of a book I recently read called Black Swan, which talks about events with low probability, but high impact. The author talks about how no one in his own native country of Lebanon in the 1970s thought a war could break out due to its multicultural, diverse, democratic and cosmopolitan society. Of course, a civil war did break out. I wonder if the events conspiring in the Koreas are another “Black Swan” in the making?
—Samuel, via iamkoream.com
A. Yes, there is always a possibility that a set of random incidents could lead to a war that nobody wants on the peninsula. However, my own sense is that this is highly unlikely. The main reason is that the balance of power on the peninsula is quite stable, as I noted above. Both sides have clear knowledge of the costs of war and the very limited benefits.
In fact, one of my pet peeves is the analogies we use to describe the situation between South and North Korea. We often call the situation a “powderkeg” or a “tinderbox,” implying a very unstable situation in which one small spark could lead to a huge explosion. But the evidence actually leads to the opposite conclusion: we have gone 60 years without a major war, despite numerous “sparks” such as the skirmish that occurred last week. If one believes the situation is a tinderbox, the only explanation for six decades without a major war is that we have been extraordinarily lucky. I prefer the opposite explanation: deterrence is quite stable, both sides know the costs of a major war, and both sides—rhetoric aside—keep smaller incidents in their proper perspective.
If my analysis is correct, the most dangerous situation would be that of a “cornered tiger”: a situation in which we back North Korea into a corner and leave it with few options. If the North Korean leadership believes its own survival is in doubt, it could decide that a last-gasp attack on the South is better than passively accepting fate.
Q. Bottom line. Do you foresee any type of war within the next few months?
—Bear, via iamkoream.com
A. Short answer: no. We have been through this “crisis” before, haven’t we? South Korean and U.S. training or patrols along disputed waters provoke an over-reaction from the North. Swift and thundering denunciations from leaders on one side lead to hyperbolic threats from the other. More military exercises are held; opinion pieces blame the North for the mess; journalists either anxiously report worry in South Korea, or alternatively wonder why the population of Seoul seems not to be worried; China calls for restraint…and then we forget about the incident until the next one comes along a few months later, when we do the same thing all over again.
It’s like that movie Groundhog Day, where Bill Murray’s character was doomed to repeat one day of his life over and over again.
Q. When I lived in South Korea in the early 2000s, I met a lot of 30-something South Koreans who were convinced that North Korea is not as “evil” as the rest of the world—especially the U.S.— would like us to believe. They said that actually U.S. actions after WWII contributed significantly to the North’s attack on the South, that the North was “compelled” to attack in order to protect its interests. It’s made me wonder that perhaps there’s more to the North’s “story” than a straight-up “they’re bad, we’re good” scenario. What do you think?
—Anna, via iamkoream.com
A. That’s a very thoughtful question. At every talk I give about North Korea, I always start with one point: that there are 22 million people living in North Korea, who are the most direct victims of Kim Jong-il’s dictatorial and repressive rule. We often overlook them, yet none of them asked to be born in North Korea, and the vast majority of them are trying to live their lives and get through their days just like we do in the U.S. or in South Korea. For example, we know very clearly how many South Korean civilians or soldiers are killed in these incidents, but we have no idea how many North Koreans are killed. None of the newspaper or television stories I have seen about the latest crisis even mention what damage might have occurred on the northern side, even though a South Korean military official said that the ROK’s return fire caused “considerable damage.” Whether it is military confrontation, economic reforms, or even North Korean human rights, we tend to de-personalize the people in the North. One of the most difficult things to do is view them as human beings like ourselves.
To answer your larger question, while there is no doubt that North Korea started the war in 1950 with the backing of the Soviet Union and China, it is also true that over the years North Korean can point to many unfilled U.S. and South Korean promises, and that they mistrust us just as much as we mistrust them. The Korean War itself caused horrific devastation, and on both sides of the peninsula between one and two million civilians were killed. Thus, “who started it” or “who is more to blame” is probably less important than the memories of loss and victimization on both sides of the DMZ. Being able to see the situation from both sides is important for anyone who truly wishes to explain the situation accurately.
However, there is also no doubt that many of the current North Korean leadership’s foreign and domestic policies are well outside global norms—shooting at civilians, proliferating and exporting nuclear weapons technology, and ruthless repression at home. The majority of those of us who follow North Korea closely want the same things: a North Korea that stops being aggressive internationally, and begins allowing political and economic opening in North Korea itself. We differ not in this goal, but only in the tactics we think might actually work.
The tragedy of the division of the peninsula in 1945 and the subsequent war is that six decades later, we are still in much the same position as we were when we started: both sides of the Korean peninsula identify the other as their primary enemy; both are locked in a zero-sum competition for legitimacy, and both sides remain locked in a bitter and tense relationship marked more by confrontation than by conciliation.
Related Articles
FOR ONLY $28!
Featured Event
One of the the biggest Asian cinema events to hit Southern California opens on May 10. The Los Angeles Asian Pacific Film Festival, presented by Visual Communications, features the latest works by established and emerging filmmakers, along with seminars, panel discussions and symposiums on topics relevant to Asian Pacific cinema.
Opening Night features “Shanghai Calling,” directed by Daniel Hsia and starring Korean American Daniel Henney, who plays a Chinese American expat lawyer navigating his way through the mean streets of Shanghai (the picture above also indicates he is a raisin smuggler). But does he take off his shirt? Go watch the movie to find out! read more
LINKS
Featuring Recent Posts Wordpress Widget development by YD
[...] some level-headed perspective on the ongoing back-and-f0rth between the Koreas, revisit the Q-and-A IamKoream.com conducted with Korea expert David Kang, director of the Korean Studies Institute at [...]
Also China does not benefit from having the North around.
Though they don’t want US bases at the Chinese borders. But, who would want a relatively militarily active foreign base at your border.
It is known prior to the N.K “surprise” attack was not much of a surprise. Rather it was a provoked by the South because, prior to the war the South was making incursions into the North. Spying and Sabotaging. While N.K did start the war. S.K did its part to lead the nation to War.
Its the same situation now.
Who benefits off of this??
Foreign nations…
Logical answers to an extremely complicated dilemma. Koreans and foreigners in Jeju definitely want to hear these answers, because we feel somewhat disconnected on so many levels. I recently wrote an article called, “Heart’s and Shells” …
(http://www.vanguardelement.com/2010/11/hearts-and-shells-korea-war/
It’s basically about my quick trip to Seoul over the weekend and seeing the Yongsan protest take place…very different environment than that of Jeju. Great answers. Onelove!